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NORMS AND LAW:
PUTTING THE HORSE BEFORE THE CART
BARAK D. RICHMAN†
ABSTRACT
Law and society scholars have long been fascinated with the
interplay of formal legal and informal extralegal procedures.
Unfortunately, the fascination has been accompanied by imprecision,
and scholars have conceptually conflated two very different
mechanisms that extralegally resolve disputes. One set of mechanisms
might be described as the “shadow of the law,” made famous by
seminal works by Professors Stewart Macaulay and Marc Galanter,
in which social coercion and custom have force because formal legal
rights are credible and reasonably defined. The other set of
mechanisms, recently explored by economic historians and legal
institutionalists, might be described as “order without law,”
1
borrowing from Professor Robert Ellickson’s famous work. In this
second mechanism, extralegal mechanisms—whether organized
shunning, violence, or social disdain—replace legal coercion to bring
social order and are an alternative to, not an extension of, formal legal
sanctions.
One victim of conflating these mechanisms has been our
understanding of industry-wide systems of private law and private
adjudication, or private legal systems. Recent examinations of private
legal systems have chiefly understood those systems as efforts to
economize on litigation and dispute-resolution costs, but private legal
systems are better understood as mechanisms that economize on
enforcement costs. This is not a small mischaracterization. Instead, it
reveals a deep misunderstanding of when and why private
enforcement systems arise in a modern economy.
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This Essay provides a taxonomy for the various mechanisms of
private ordering. These assorted mechanisms, despite their important
differences, have been conflated in large part because there has been a
poor understanding of the particular institutional efficiencies and
costs of the alternative systems. Specifically, enforcement costs have
often been inadequately distinguished from procedural or disputeresolution costs, and this imprecision has produced theories that
inaccurately predict when private ordering will thrive and when the
costs of private ordering overwhelm corresponding efficiencies. The
implications for institutional theory are significant, as confusion in the
literature has led to overappreciation of private ordering,
underappreciation of social institutions, and Panglossian attitudes
toward both lawlessness and legal development.
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INTRODUCTION
Among the most salient features of modern courts are that they
are expensive, slow, and inaccurate. Parties to a contract
unsurprisingly anticipate many of these shortcomings and write
contracts that can reduce the costs, delays, and mistakes that are often
associated with enforcing agreements in court. Common strategies are
to write contracts with detailed substantive provisions, choice-of-law
clauses, and—especially—arbitration clauses.
Of course, even detailed contracts are costly and cumbersome to
enforce, and parties frequently seek nonlegal mechanisms to enforce
their agreements. Professor Stuart Macaulay is credited with
triggering a renaissance of scholarly inquiry when he reported that
businesspeople try to enforce agreements without resorting to legal
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coercion. Although the observation seems self-evident—perhaps
only in retrospect—it marked the start of a growing scholarly
fascination with the world of extralegal enforcement: law and society
scholars inquired into the social structures that induced contractual
3
compliance, law and economics scholars examined the extralegal
4
institutions that maintained economic governance, and legal
historians investigated how commercial agreements were sustained in
5
premodern times in the absence of court ordering.
Among the most important strands of scholarship on extralegal
enforcement have been inquiries, most famously by Professor Lisa
Bernstein, into comprehensive private arbitration systems, or private
6
legal systems. This research primarily consists of case studies of
industry groups in which a community of merchants, under the
auspices of a trade association, require commercial dealings to
conform to standard contracts and trade practices, agree to resolve all
disputes through private industry arbitration, and appoint wellrespected fellow merchants to serve as arbitrators. Merchants who fail
to comply with arbitration decisions are expelled from the trade
association and are targeted with economic sanctions, including
monetary judgments and the foreclosing of commercial opportunities,
7
and frequently with noneconomic social sanctions as well.
Unfortunately, scholarship of industry-wide arbitration systems
has suffered from a lack of conceptual clarity. On one hand, this
scholarship focuses on the substantive rules in private legal systems
and contributes to doctrinal debates in contract law by observing that
the tailored rules create administrative efficiencies in resolving
8
disputes. On the other hand, this scholarship also emphasizes the role

2. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM.
SOC. REV. 55, 61 (1963) (“Disputes are frequently settled without reference to the contract or
potential or actual legal sanctions.”).
3. See, e.g., Marcel Fafchamps, The Enforcement of Commercial Contracts in Ghana, 24
WORLD DEV. 427, 441 (1996) (discussing the fishmonger women of Accra who punish bad
payers by screaming and shouting at them when they enter the market); Marc Galanter, Justice
in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 27
(1981) (“[T]he social landscape is covered by layers and centers of indigenous law.”); Macaulay,
supra note 2, at 64 (“Sellers who do not satisfy their customers become the subject of
discussion . . . at country clubs or social gatherings where members of top management meet.”).
4. See, e.g., infra notes 27, 67.
5. See, e.g., infra note 10.
6. See infra notes 30, 51, 52.
7. See infra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 59, 61 and accompanying text.
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of extralegal sanctions in enforcing agreements, suggesting that
9
extralegal mechanisms create enforcement efficiencies. By focusing
on both substantive rules and enforcement efficiencies, however,
scholarship has conflated two dramatically different economic
problems. In fact, economizing on the administrative costs of
resolving disputes and economizing on the institutional costs of
securing transactions are distinct challenges, and thus instruments
that arise to address administrative costs need to be treated
separately from those arising to economize on enforcement costs. The
presence of both types of instruments in private legal systems suggests
that they are responding to separate challenges, and perhaps that one
challenge might have more predictive power than the other.
This Essay aims to clarify the economic problems that private
legal systems present and to confront the assorted instances in which
extralegal mechanisms emerge. Once we understand the instances in
which extralegal mechanisms arise, we can formulate better
definitions for the assortment of informal mechanisms and recognize
their economic significance. Part I reviews the expanding literature on
private ordering and identifies two distinct categories of selfenforcement mechanisms that by-and-large have been conflated: one
category includes mechanisms in which private ordering operates
within the “shadow of the law” and includes formal and informal
arbitration arrangements that, despite appearing private, nonetheless
rely on state coercion; a second category includes mechanisms that
utilize nonstate coercive instruments to secure contracts privately,
thus securing “order without law.” Part II highlights important
differences between these categories and identifies their distinct
features, and Part III then explains why private legal systems belong
in the second category and why scholars have mistakenly conflated
them with arbitration systems. Part IV then addresses the problems in
conventional theory—and the adjudication-determination hypothesis
it fosters—that has led to misunderstanding private legal systems, and
Part V offers a replacement theory that articulates an enforcementdetermination hypothesis. In articulating the economic attributes of
alternative enforcement mechanisms, Part V then clarifies that certain
private ordering systems arise specifically to address enforcement
challenges, and only by understanding these systems as enforcement
instruments can we truly understand their economic significance.
Central to this alternative approach is the recognition that private
9. See infra notes 27, 30 and accompanying text.
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enforcement introduces new costs and therefore presents its own
tradeoffs. By overlooking these tradeoffs, current theory overstates
the true role of private ordering and overemphasizes the creation of
adjudication efficiencies. This overlooking has not been a small error,
but instead reveals a deep misunderstanding of when and why private
ordering arises in the modern economy. The resulting theoretical
confusion has led to overappreciation of private ordering,
underappreciation for social institutions, and Panglossian attitudes
toward both lawlessness and legal development.
I. THE MANY FACES OF PRIVATE LAW
Perhaps the most efficacious feature of state-sponsored courts is
their availability, within jurisdictional limits, to all commercial parties.
Institutional economists and economic historians credit this very
feature—the ability to enforce impersonal exchange—for statesponsored courts’ central role in propelling the economic progress of
10
nations. In other words, state-sponsored courts’ ability to enforce
agreements between strangers has been credited with enabling
economic activity that had difficulty thriving in premodern societies.
Despite this very attractive economic feature, state-sponsored
courts also impose significant costs on those who use them—timeconsuming procedures, expensive lawyers, delayed resolutions, and
11
difficult-to-predict outcomes. Consequently, parties in a dispute use
a panoply of mechanisms to avoid the courtroom. This Part identifies
two prominent species of extralegal mechanisms—those operating in

10. See, e.g., Avner Greif, The Birth of Impersonal Exchange: The Community
Responsibility System and Impartial Justice, 20 J. ECON. PERSP. 221, 222 (2006); Avner Greif,
Institutions and Impersonal Exchange: The European Experience 1 (Ctr. on Democracy, Dev., &
the Rule of Law, Working Paper No. 14, 2004). It is hard to overemphasize the significance of
state institutions that enable exchange. No less than Nobel laureate Douglass North has
advanced the strong claim that “the inability of societies to develop effective, low-cost
enforcement of contracts is the most important source of both historical stagnation and
contemporary underdevelopment in the Third World.” DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS,
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 54 (1990). The world has by-andlarge listened to North’s admonition, as international agencies and external donors have
invested heavily to promote the rule of law and law reform in many developing countries. See
Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, FOREIGN AFF. Mar.–Apr. 1998, at 95, 103–04
(discussing Western development efforts designed to effectuate rule-of-law reform).
11. See, e.g., THOMAS CHURCH, JR., ALAN CARLSON, JO-LYNNE LEE & TERESA TAN,
JUSTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS 2 (1978); Thomas H.
Cohen, Civil Trial Delay in State Courts: The Effect of Case and Litigant Level Characteristics, 95
JUDICATURE 158, 159 (2012).
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the “shadow of the law” and those that create “order without law”—
that parties use to resolve disputes.
A. Shadow of the Law
One category of mechanisms might be described as settling
disputes within the “shadow” of the law, a metaphor first coined by
Professor Martin Shapiro when he observed a lack of delineation
12
between courts and other systems of adjudication. Although
Professor Shapiro used the term to emphasize that the law’s shadow
was distorted from law itself, the metaphor has come to represent the
broad space in which parties understand the possibility of legal
coercion. Professor Galanter, criticizing the legal academy’s
13
preoccupation with “legal centralism,” argued that the law’s primary
14
impact on human behavior is through its casting of a shadow. Thus,
Professor Galanter argued, the “principle contribution of courts to
dispute resolution is providing a background of norms and
procedures against which negotiations and regulation in both private
15
and governmental settings take place.”
Under Professor Galanter’s view of the law’s shadow, parties
have a reasonably accurate understanding of their legal rights—
specifically, the rights that a state-sponsored court will enforce with
the state’s coercive powers—and will manage their transactions and
disputes accordingly. Professor Macaulay’s early observation that
businesspeople will seek to avoid litigation, particularly if less
expensive alternatives are available, is best understood as parties
16
maximizing within the law’s shadow. Professors Robert Mnookin
and Lewis Kornhauser modeled and explored the parameters of the

12. Martin Shapiro, Courts, in 5 HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 321, 328–29 (Fred I.
Greenstein & Nelson W. Polsby eds., 1975).
13. Professor Galanter’s criticism of “legal centralism,” a label he borrowed from Professor
John Griffiths, targeted a “state-centered view of legal phenomena” in which scholars tend to
discuss only those legal instruments found in public courts, to the exclusion of the broad array of
private enforcement mechanisms. Galanter, supra note 3, at 1 n.1. The onslaught of scholarship
exploring private ordering and private legal systems might convince Professor Galanter to
temper his criticism.
14. Id. at 24.
15. Id. at 19.
16. See Macaulay, supra note 2, at 62 (“The legal position of the parties can influence
negotiations even though legal rights or litigation are never mentioned in their
discussions . . . .”).
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law’s shadow in their seminal analysis of divorce settlements.
Moreover, the logic extends far beyond conduct that arises within a
transactional dispute. The law’s shadow and its articulation of legal
entitlements reduce uncertainty and establish a well-understood
foundation from which parties pursue cooperation. Professors George
Priest and Benjamin Klein’s economic analysis of how parties settle
disputes falls squarely within the understanding of how the law’s
18
shadow encourages private ordering within public legal constraints,
and the logic of the law’s shadow extends to all sorts of cooperative
interactions, including inducing precautionary behavior by would-be
tortfeasors and deterring property-rights violations from would-be
trespassers. These related theories illustrate that once legal
entitlements are clearly defined, parties can economize on litigation
costs and reach agreements through Coasean bargaining. So long as
the law’s shadow is well defined, parties can engage in mutually
valuable conduct without assuming the costs inherent in state-made
19
legal procedures.
The growing and elaborate world of arbitration also falls neatly
within Professor Galanter’s view of the law’s shadow. Parties enter
into agreements with the confidence that those agreements are
enforceable by state-sponsored courts. Parties similarly understand
the default rules in state-made contract and procedural law, and they
use arbitration clauses and other contract mechanisms to superimpose
alternative rules and procedures that better meet their collective
needs. These privately crafted substantive rules are credible because
they too are products of a legally enforceable contract, and a court
will enforce arbitration clauses at least as aggressively as—and
20
probably more aggressively than—any other legal entitlement. Thus,
17. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979). Professors Mnookin and Kornhauser are
credited for popularizing the shadow metaphor.
18. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1984) (“This paper presents a model of the litigation process that clarifies
the relationship between the set of disputes settled and the set litigated.”).
19. Cf. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 44 (1960) (arguing
that once legal entitlements are clearly defined, parties will bargain for a socially efficient
outcome).
20. The Supreme Court has accumulated a rich history of aggressively and enthusiastically
enforcing the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16, 201–208 (2006), which
establishes “a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,” Moses H. Cone Mem’l
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); see also CompuCredit Corp. v.
Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 670–71 (2012) (discussing several cases in which the Court found
that the FAA overrode other statutory provisions). Recently, the Supreme Court’s enthusiasm
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arbitration might be considered a formalization of the informal
mechanisms Professor Macaulay observed that are built atop courtenforced entitlements.
B. Order Without Law
A second mechanism could be described as “order without law,”
21
borrowing from Professor Robert Ellickson’s famous work. Unlike
conduct within the law’s shadow, which builds upon legal defaults and
relies on state-sponsored coercion, this mechanism involves a much
more categorical rejection of state law and state institutions. In
Professor Ellickson’s study, Shasta County ranchers (in contrast to
22
what the Coase theorem would predict) rejected the county’s
substantive property law and in its place articulated alternative
23
substantive rules. To enforce these alternative rules, ranchers
established an informal network of gossip and social sanctions, so
violators of the community’s norms and customs suffered from scorn
24
and exclusion. Central to Professor Ellickson’s order-without-law
framework are substantive rules and extralegal enforcement
mechanisms that are wholly outside the parameters of the state. His
book earns its title because neither state law nor the law’s shadow
25
plays a role in securing social order. Order and enforcement of
community norms arise entirely from indigenous community
institutions.
Self-enforcement systems that rely on indigenous institutions
have recently attracted enormous attention from legal scholars of all
sorts, and although some have speculated that these methods arise
from internal notions of justice and innate motivations of guilt or

for arbitration agreements has extended to enforcing arbitration clauses despite state laws
designed to guarantee consumers the right to litigate, CompuCredit Corp., 132 S. Ct. at 673, and
to preclude consumers from joining class actions, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct.
1740, 1750–51 (2011).
21. ELLICKSON, supra note 1.
22. Id. at 3–4 (“Shasta County Neighbors, it turns out, do not behave as Coase portrays
them as behaving in the Farmer-Rancher Parable. Neighbors in fact are strongly inclined to
cooperate, but they achieve cooperative outcomes not by bargaining from legally established
entitlements, as the parable supposes, but rather by developing and enforcing adaptive norms of
neighborliness that trump formal legal entitlements.”).
23. See id. at 231–32 (describing specific Shasta County norms for settling disputes and
sanctioning undesirable behavior).
24. Id. at 232–33.
25. To the contrary, the state would only enforce its own substantive law, not the ranchers’
alternative. See id. at 42–48.
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magnanimity, the economic logic might simply follow from
Machiavelli: “[P]eople cannot make themselves secure except by
26
In order-without-law systems, extralegal
being powerful.”
mechanisms—whether organized shunning, social disdain, or
violence—replace state-sponsored legal coercion to bring about social
order and are an alternative to, not an extension of, formal legal
sanctions. Thus, this second mechanism is practically a conceptual
opposite of arbitration. Even though both traditional arbitration and
extralegal methods constitute efforts to avoid state-sponsored courts,
the former relies on state-sponsored coercion whereas the latter is a
rejection of it and relies instead on nonstate coercion. Social sanctions
play the role of the marshal, and custom or social norms define the
entitlements and constraints that guide parties’ conduct.
Order-without-law enforcement relies on a diversity of
instruments. For example, many merchant communities in early
commercial societies that predated modern state institutions and
state-enforced contract law used private reputational enforcement to
27
secure transactions. Several merchant communities or merchant
fairs—including famously the Champagne Fairs—used law merchants
to adjudicate disputes, and commerce was foreclosed to any merchant
28
with an unsatisfied judgment against him. Thus, rulings from law
merchants initiated group boycotts that penalized merchants who had
been found to breach their contractual obligations. Similar group
sanctions are used in modern-day communities in less-developed
26. Niccolò Machiavelli, Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius bk. I (1531), in 2
HISTORICAL, POLITICAL, AND DIPLOMATIC WRITINGS OF NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI 93, 97
(Christian E. Detmold trans., Boston, James R. Osgood & Co. 1882).
27. See, e.g., Karen Clay, Trade Without Law: Private-Order Institutions in Mexican
California, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 202, 211–12 (1997) (examining private contractual
enforcement among Spanish merchants in 1830s California); Avner Greif, Contract
Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition, 83
AM. ECON. REV. 525, 528–31 (1993) (examining private contractual enforcement among
eleventh-century Mediterranean merchants); Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in
Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 857, 868–71 (1989)
(same); Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, The Role of Institutions in
the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs, 2 ECON. &
POL. 1, 4–6 (1990) (modeling the private adjudication system used by medieval European
traders).
28. See, e.g., Milgrom et al., supra note 27, at 5 (“[M]erchants that failed to abide by the
decisions of judges would not be merchants for long.”). For other perspectives on the law
merchants and their reliance on assorted forms of law and legal institutions, see, for example,
Emily Kadens, The Myth of the Customary Law Merchant, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1153, 1158 (2012);
and Stephen E. Sachs, From St. Ives to Cyberspace: The Modern Distortion of the Medieval
“Law Merchant,” 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 685, 690 (2006).
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nations where contract law and independent judiciaries are not yet
reliable. For example, Ghanaian and Vietnamese merchant
communities, who do not have access to reliable state-sponsored
courts, instead spread reputational information among themselves,
such that any merchant with a checkered history is foreclosed from
29
future commerce. Many such tight-knit communities, in addition to
coordinating sanctions that impose economic harm, also inflict
noneconomic punishments, including social shunning and reducing
30
social status. Illegal transactions offer a third example of extralegal
sanctions. For example, the mafia and other criminal networks resort
to self-enforcement because their illegal transactions are
31
unenforceable in state-sponsored courts. The colorful world of
pirates, whether viewed as illegal economic conduct or as prelegal
commerce, illustrates that self-enforcement mechanisms can fit into
32
several of these categories.
The common feature linking these disparate enforcement
systems is their reliance on private, nonstate sanctions to discipline
individuals. Many of these mechanisms emerged when reliable statesponsored contract enforcement was unavailable. The law merchant,
for example, constructed premodern commercial networks before the
29. See, e.g., Fafchamps, supra note 3, at 442–43 (discussing the limited role of legal
institutions in enforcing contracts between Ghanaian firms); John McMillan & Christopher
Woodruff, Dispute Prevention Without Courts in Vietnam, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 637, 640–41
(1999) (describing the use of reputation mechanisms and private ordering to enforce contracts
between Vietnamese businesspeople); Christopher Woodruff, Contract Enforcement and Trade
Liberalization in Mexico’s Footwear Industry, 26 WORLD DEV. 979, 986–88 (1998) (tracing the
evolution of private contract enforcement in the Mexican footwear industry as trade barriers
were liberalized).
30. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1776 (2001)
(recording several examples of noneconomic punishments used in the cotton industry);
Fafchamps, supra note 3, at 428 (“The simplest form of retaliation is the refusal to further
transact.”); Barak D. Richman, How Community Institutions Create Economic Advantage:
Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 383, 407–08 (2006)
(discussing private enforcement mechanisms, such as excommunication, utilized by Orthodox
Jewish communities involved in the diamond trade).
31. See, e.g., Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark Side of Private Ordering: An
Institutional and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 43 (2000)
(arguing that organized crime provides a “response to inefficiencies in the property rights and
enforcement framework supplied by the state”); see also Richman, supra note 30, at 414
(“Jewish diamond merchants have employed their community institutions to profit from illegal
goods.”).
32. See PETER T. LEESON, THE INVISIBLE HOOK: THE HIDDEN ECONOMICS OF PIRATES
58–70 (2009) (discussing the pirate code as a system of self-governance maintained by extralegal
force and reputation enforcement systems).
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administrative instruments of modern governments were available,
and Ghanaian merchants organized effective markets despite that
34
nation’s underdeveloped public institutions. These merchant
communities illustrate the possibility of organizing commerce without
state support and reveal insights both into the ancestors of
commercial societies and the utility of modern courts. Most scholars
have characterized these enforcement systems as prelaw orders that
serve important commercial functions but are readily supplanted
35
when reliable public ordering emerges. Yet many of these systems
persist into the modern world of developed economies, and they
remain a viable strategy for contemporary merchants who continue to
enforce transactions without aid from state-sponsored courts.
Although merchants might construct these extralegal
enforcement methods for many of the same reasons that merchants
devise arbitration systems or seek out-of-court settlements—namely,
to avoid the courtroom—they rest on wholly different sources of
coercion. For those within the law’s shadow, the state ultimately
secures transactional credibility. For those maintaining order without
law, order rests on violence, shaming, and other forms of private
coercion.
II. THE VARYING FORMALITY OF INFORMAL ENFORCEMENT
In most legal and economic scholarship, the term “informal
enforcement” is used to describe the sort of extralegal, private
enforcement systems that typify those in the order-without-law
36
category. This is an unfortunate label because formality, in the
33. See Milgrom et al., supra note 27, at 5 (“[T]he Law Merchant came to govern most
commercial transactions in Europe, providing a uniform set of standards across large numbers
of locations.”).
34. See Fafchamps, supra note 3, at 445 (“The institutional response Ghanaian firms have
found to enforcement problems is to deal with a handful of suppliers and clients that they have
known for years.”).
35. See Avner Greif, Institutions and Impersonal Exchange: The European Experience 32
(Stanford Law Sch., John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 284, 2004),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 548783 (“In England . . . the
state enabled the communities to abolish and then replace the [prelaw enforcement
mechanisms].”).
36. See, e.g., Michihiro Kandori, Social Norms and Community Enforcement, 59 REV.
ECON. STUD. 63, 63 (1992) (“It is widely recognized that in many economic transactions,
informal means are employed to execute mutually beneficial agreements. As [Professor
Macaulay] points out, ‘social pressure’ and ‘reputation’ are perhaps more widely used than
formal contracts and filing suits.” (quoting Macaulay, supra note 2, at 63)); Joel Sobel, For
Better or Forever: Formal Versus Informal Enforcement, 24 J.L. & ECON. 271, 271–72 (2006)
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colloquial sense, varies widely across both order-without-law and
shadow-of-the-law mechanisms. Moreover, formality is an important
but often misleading dimension of variance. On one hand,
mechanisms that vary in their formality exhibit important differences
that reflect key elements of their institutional environment. On the
other hand, differences in formality obscure key similarities and often
reflect merely cosmetic variation.
Degrees of formality across extralegal enforcement mechanisms
range from what could be called spontaneous mechanisms to
structured, or bureaucratic, mechanisms. Much as Friedrich Hayek
credited unregulated markets for providing “spontaneous order,”
because no deliberate coordination is required to maintain accurate
37
price mechanisms, spontaneous reputation mechanisms similarly
require no deliberate coordination. Shasta County cattle ranchers
might be a paradigmatic illustration of spontaneous private
38
enforcement. The ranchers relied only on word of mouth and casual
gossip to spread reputational information, never formally established
or articulated norms defining unacceptable behavior, and never
demanded a collective commitment to inflict a coordinated
39
punishment. Instead, information spread throughout the community
without institutional help, and individual ranchers responded to
specific conduct according to their personal ethical beliefs and their
40
understanding of customary expectations. Without any centralizing
institutions, Shasta County ranchers directed scorn and denied
fruitful relationships to individuals who transgressed customary codes
41
of conduct. Spontaneous reputation mechanisms, therefore, are
highly informal: community members respond individually and
spontaneously, without explicit coordination, yet their collective
response to particular conduct inflicts both economic and psychic
costs to those who violate established norms.

(contrasting an informal enforcement system of relational contracting with formal legal
enforcement mechanisms).
37. F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 519 (1945)
(“The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order is determined precisely by
the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in
concentrated or integrated form, but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently
contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess.”).
38. ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 123–36.
39. See id. at 52–62.
40. See id. at 232–33.
41. See id.
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Alternatively, there is a great deal of highly formal and often
legalistic extralegal dispute resolution. The most pervasive instance of
formal-yet-alternative dispute resolution is the modern world of
arbitration. The American Arbitration Association (AAA), for
example, is a leading collection of arbitrators that, for hire, resolve
42
Although
commercial, labor, and other complex disputes.
advertising their services for “individuals and organizations who wish
43
to resolve conflicts out of court,” AAA arbitrators nonetheless
adhere to a large body of complex rules and procedures, including a
44
comprehensive code of ethics and a due-process protocol. The
complexity and formality of this world of alternative dispute
resolution rivals the formality of modern state-sponsored courts and
is a world away from how both Shasta County’s ranchers and
Professor Macaulay’s businesspeople resolve disputes.
Similar to many modern arbitration systems, the law merchants’
courts at medieval fairs were formal constructions of private
enforcement. Private judges were designated as independent
adjudicators of disputes between merchants, and they followed
established protocols to acquire information and then issue and
45
disseminate rulings. Although neither the judges nor the fairs had
coercive authority to enforce judgments, the judges’ dissemination of
their rulings triggered a coordinated boycott among the law
46
merchants that denied business to any wrongdoer. In contrast to
Shasta County’s spontaneous enforcement, the law merchants
established formal institutions to probe into particular disputes, apply
merchant norms in determining wrongdoing, and spread reputational
information. And like modern-day professional arbitrators, the
42. See AAA Missions and Principles, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, http://www.adr.org/
aaa/faces/s/about/mission (last visited Nov. 2, 2012) (“The American Arbitration Association
was founded . . . with the specific goal of helping implement arbitration as an out-of-court
solution to resolving disputes.”).
43. About
American
Arbitration
Association,
AM.
ARBITRATION
ASS’N,
http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/s/about (last visited Nov. 2, 2012).
44. See Search Codes & Protocols, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, http://www.adr.org/aaa/
faces/rules/codes (last visited Nov. 2, 2012) (displaying the codes and protocols that govern
AAA arbitrators).
45. See Milgrom et al., supra note 27, at 4 (noting the importance of “legal codes governing
commercial transactions and administered by private judges drawn from the commercial
ranks”); Sachs, supra note 28, at 747 (“By virtue of their profession, merchants could be judged
by the law merchant as opposed to common law . . . .”). Professor Avinash Dixit explains why
the private judges would have been incentivized to maintain their own reputations for accuracy
and honesty. AVINASH DIXIT, LAWLESSNESS AND ECONOMICS 97–123 (2007).
46. Milgrom et al., supra note 27, at 3.
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private judges had structured factfinding proceedings and needed to
47
justify their conclusions.
Other reputation enforcement mechanisms have varying degrees
of formality that might fall between Shasta County’s spontaneity and
the law merchants’ formality. During Vietnam’s early stages of
economic liberalization, for example, Vietnamese merchants relied
on commercial-information networks, families, and common trade
connections—a system that could be characterized as moderately
48
formal. Nineteenth-century traders in Mexican California relied on a
similarly semiformal network of abbeys and monasteries as
49
informational conduits to learn and share reputational information.
And Seafax, an internet company that serves wholesalers of caught
fish, serves as a highly formal informational instrument within a
spontaneous reputation mechanism. The company compiles the
payment histories of prospective buyers of fish, along with their credit
records and other publicly available financial data, to help sellers
50
decide with whom they will transact. These information mechanisms
are quite formal, but they trigger a spontaneous collective
punishment.
In sum, although the collection of private enforcement systems
spans time, geography, and culture, two significant dimensions of
variation have emerged in the literature. The first concerns the source
of coercion that secures transactional compliance, in which some
systems rely ultimately on the state whereas others rely on private
power. The second is the degree of formality that characterizes the
dispute-resolution and adjudicatory mechanisms. The institutional
features of these assorted mechanisms of enforcement can thus be
summarized in the following schema:

47. See Milgrom et al., supra note 27, at 16 (“[Law Merchants] may wish to maintain their
reputation for honesty and diligence in order to keep the business active.”); Sachs, supra note
28, at 765 (“Decisions reached in the courts of other cities or communities could be challenged
and even reversed in the fair court.”).
48. See McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 29, at 638 (“Firms often scrutinize prospective
trading partners before beginning to transact, checking the firms’ reliability via other firms in
the same line of business or familial connections.”).
49. Cf. Clay, supra note 27, at 204 (“The mission priests traded directly with the ships’
captains and supercargoes who brought goods to the coast.”).
50. Seafax Products and Services, SEAFAX, http://www.seafax.com/about/Products (last
visited Nov. 2, 2012).
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Figure 1: Alternative Enforcement Mechanisms

III. PRIVATE LEGAL SYSTEMS—A CONFUSING HYBRID
A particular species of private ordering system that has received
significant academic attention is industry-wide arbitration systems
that use both privately tailored industry law and privately ordered
industry sanctions. In these private legal systems, a particular
merchant community—which often comprises an entire industry
segment and is frequently organized as a trade association—
constructs an elaborate system of law and procedure that is
responsible for all disputes within the merchant community. Professor
Bernstein is a leader in uncovering such systems, including those
51
supporting the Diamond Dealers Club of New York, the National
52
Grain and Feed Association (NGFA), and the assorted trade
53
associations that govern America’s cotton merchants. Professors
John McMillan and Christopher Woodruff uncover similarly
organized reputation systems that enforce agreements made by
America’s fresh-fish wholesalers and by New York’s dress
51. Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 119–21 (1992).
52. Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1769 (1996).
53. Bernstein, supra note 30, at 1724.
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manufacturers, and other scholars have brought this analytical lens
more recently to studies of kosher certification, food labeling, and
55
eco-friendly accreditation.
A number of common features typify these trade-association-led
private legal systems. First, the arbitration systems are highly
developed and comprehensive, employing fellow merchants as
elected arbitrators, relying on specialized law, and using expedited
procedures. These systems resemble the formality of the AAA’s
arbitration procedures but invoke privately crafted substantive and
procedural rules that are tailored to the needs and common concerns
of disputing merchants, such as requiring industry-provided form
contracts or delivery of goods by certain times and in certain
56
measurements. Second, these arbitration systems tend to assume
exclusive authority over all industry disputes. Not only do all
merchants have access to arbitrators to resolve any dispute with a
fellow merchant, merchants are also prohibited from seeking redress
57
in alternative venues, including state-sponsored courts. And third,
failure to comply with an arbitration ruling leads to expulsion from
the trade association. Although expulsion in its own right is not
terribly costly, it signals untrustworthiness to other merchants,
58
thereby foreclosing future commerce. In other words, much like the

54. John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public
Order, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2421, 2436, 2442 (2000).
55. See generally, e.g., TIMOTHY D. LYTTON, KOSHER: PRIVATE REGULATION IN THE AGE
OF INDUSTRIAL FOOD (forthcoming 2013) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); Magali A.
Delmas & Ann K. Terlaak, A Framework for Analyzing Environmental Voluntary Agreements,
CAL. MGMT. REV., Spring 2001, at 44; Shana Starobin & Erika Weinthal, The Search for
Credible Information in Social and Environmental Global Governance: The Kosher Label, 12
BUS. & POL., no. 3, 2010, at 1.
56. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 52, at 1777 (describing the NGFA arbitrators’ hierarchy
of authority and noting that NGFA arbitrators consult trade rules and trade practice before the
Uniform Commercial Code and other statutes); Bernstein supra note 51, at 122 (discussing
trade-specific, formalized rules of offer and acceptance); Bernstein, supra note 30, at 1732 (“The
[Memphis Cotton Exchange] decides cases on the basis of the Exchange’s own Trading
Rules . . . .”).
57. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 52, at 1771–72 (“As a condition of membership in the
Association, members must agree to submit all disputes with other members to the
Association’s arbitration system.”); Bernstein, supra note 51, at 120 (“Unless the club opts not
to hear the case, the member may not seek redress of his grievances in court.”); Bernstein, supra
note 30, at 1727 (“Most [shippers’ associations] require members to arbitrate disputes with other
members as a condition of membership.”).
58. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 52, at 1772 (“A member who refuses to submit to
arbitration or fails to comply with an arbitration award rendered against him may . . . be
suspended or expelled from the Association.”); Bernstein, supra note 51, at 130 (explaining that
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sanctions triggered by a ruling by a private judge in the Champagne
Fairs, an adverse arbitration ruling and expulsion from the trade
association triggers a coordinated group boycott.
Private legal systems have caused some conceptual confusion
that has not only clouded our understanding of different private
ordering mechanisms, but has also impeded a precise appreciation of
these systems themselves. The source of the confusion is self-evident.
On one hand, from appearances, private legal systems primarily look
like arbitration arrangements and thus resemble the world of
arbitration that operates within Professor Galanter’s shadow of legal
entitlements. On the other hand, they rely on social sanctions, not
legal instruments, to effectuate arbitrators’ rulings. At first blush,
private legal systems appear to be an engineered synthesis of both
arbitration and social sanctions.
Legal scholarship in particular has contributed to the confusion
by focusing attention on the adjudication efficiencies generated from
industry-tailored law. Scholars observe that specialized substantive
rules reduce the complexity and required time to generate rulings,
that streamlined procedures reduce the costs of advancing or
defending claims, and that expert adjudicators produce more accurate
59
rulings than generalist judges or juries. In short, legal enthusiasts
proclaim, private legal systems are more efficient, reliable, and
accurate.
One cannot blame legal scholars for focusing on the features that
are naturally of greatest interest to them. If private legal systems were
a Rorschach test, legal scholars—who are deeply familiar with the
costs of adjudicating disputes in state-sponsored courts—would
remark on the systems’ specialized law and procedures to identify
administrative efficiencies. This enthusiasm is not just understandable
but, in large part, quite justified. Private legal systems do generate
arbitrators sometimes pursue judgment in the rabbinical courts, which have the power to
exclude an individual from participating in Jewish community life).
59. See, e.g., Alex Raskolnikov, The Cost of Norms: Tax Effects of Tacit Understandings, 74
U. CHI. L. REV. 601, 661–62 (2007) (noting that parties gain certain efficiencies by relying on
contractual norms rather than written contracts); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract
Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 619 (2003) (“A law merchant
appropriate to our time would be a merchants’ law; and for merchants, the less publicly supplied
law the better.”). Professor Bernstein continues to contribute to this field. See Lisa Bernstein,
An (Un)Common Frame of Reference: An American Perspective on the Jurisprudence of the
CESL, COMMON MKT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2067196 (“[The European Commission] should create an
instrument with a menu of clear, detailed, contract rules . . . .”).
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meaningful administrative efficiencies, and there is much to learn
from the benefits of industry-wide and industry-made substantive and
procedural rules. Appreciation for these systems’ administrative
efficiencies has been part of, and has contributed to, what has been
called the New Formalism, probably the most significant
60
development in contract scholarship in the past two decades.
But this scholarly enthusiasm has led to a causality error. More
than merely admiring the adjudication efficiencies, scholars have
argued that merchant communities develop private legal systems
specifically to capture these savings. Professor Bernstein, for
example, explicitly describes private legal systems as an “opting out”
of state-sponsored dispute resolution, suggesting that state-sponsored
courts are a viable but merely less preferable venue, and that
constructing a private legal system reflects a deliberate choice to
61
capture litigation savings. Scholars of contract law and civil
procedure frequently characterize private legal systems with the same
language, and as achieving the same purposes, as rudimentary
62
arbitration agreements. They thus view the private enforcement of
arbitration rulings as conduct within the shadow of otherwise
enforceable law, and they have conceived private legal systems to be
close relatives of more typical arbitration systems.
Despite appearances, private legal systems do not arise to
economize on transaction costs and thus should not be viewed as a
generalizable species of arbitration. To the contrary, they arise out of
idiosyncratic circumstances, achieve different efficiencies and
objectives, and operate under a different theoretical framework from

60. See David Charny, The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 842, 842 (1999)
(“We are now in the midst of a third phase, a phase of ‘anti-antiformalism’ that seeks to
discredit and displace Llewellyn’s claim to found commercial law in immanent commercial
practice.”). Professor Bernstein’s scholarship has played a leading role in building the New
Formalism movement. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 52. Two other leaders of New Formalism
are Professors Robert Scott and Alan Schwartz. See, e.g., Schwartz & Scott, supra note 59.
61. See Bernstein, supra note 51, at 126 (“[A]rbitration is preferable to litigation because it
is cheaper, faster, and subjects the member to [unique] pressures to pay promptly.”).
62. See, e.g., Adam B. Badawi, Interpretive Preferences and the Limits of the New
Formalism, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 48–49 (2009) (discussing industry-specific arbitration
systems); Ted Schneyer, The Organized Bar and the Collaborative Bar Movement: A Study in
Professional Change, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 289, 301 (2008) (characterizing the collaborative-law
movement in divorce proceedings as “an offshoot of the preexisting alternative dispute
resolution (‘ADR’) movement”).
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63

typical arbitration. The defining features of these private legal
systems are not, as much of the literature suggests, their rigorous use
of arbitrators or their formulation of tailored law. Instead, the key
features are how their agreements are enforced and the nature of the
coercive mechanisms they employ. Because private legal systems rely
on private sanctions and private enforcement, they are more
accurately understood as instances of private ordering. They have
much more in common with Professor Ellickson’s Shasta County
ranchers than they do with arbitrators or other conduct that takes
place within the shadow of the law. Accordingly, legal scholarship has
overemphasized the role of adjudication efficiencies and has failed to
develop a theory that accounts for private legal systems’ other
economic attributes. And any such theory would recognize that these
other attributes have more predictive power than adjudication
efficiencies.
IV. THREE STRIKES FOR THE CURRENT THEORY
Scholarly enthusiasm for adjudication efficiencies—minimizing
the costs, time, and errors in producing adjudication rulings—has
generated the incorrect conclusion that adjudication efficiencies
induce the emergence of private legal systems. This is the
adjudication-determination hypothesis, in which adjudication
efficiencies are the horse that drives the private legal system’s cart of
private enforcement. But although specialized procedures tend to
emerge alongside private enforcement mechanisms, they neither
cause the creation of private enforcement nor drive a departure from
state-sponsored courts. Instead, they are merely secondary
consequences of what ultimately is an economizing of enforcement
costs. Three foundational mistakes in the literature on private legal
systems reveal why industry-tailored law and industry-wide
arbitration do not lead to private enforcement.
First, the adjudication-determination hypothesis does not explain
why private legal systems are relatively few in number. If the
motivation behind private legal systems is to generate litigation
efficiencies, then it is curious that they are so rare. It is almost beyond
doubt that tailored law and streamlined procedures enable private

63. Cf. Charny, supra note 60, at 843 (“[T]rade association formalism . . . does not counsel
formalism in commercial law generally; rather, it reflects, and takes advantage of, the
idiosyncratic institutional structures of the associations themselves.”).
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legal systems to enjoy substantial efficiencies over public courts, but
why does economic research overwhelmingly indicate that reliable
65
public courts are central to facilitating economic growth? And why
did most historical instances of private ordering dissolve with the
66
emergence of public courts?
Missing from conventional understandings of private legal
systems is that, in addition to enjoying meaningful efficiency
advantages over public courts, they also impose significant costs that
public courts do not. These costs are unrelated to the litigation
process, however, and instead involve the institutional efficiencies of
enforcing contracts. Because private legal systems rely on sustained
reciprocity, they offer credibility only to insiders and thus erect
67
significant entry barriers to outsiders. The balancing of enforcement
costs—the benefits of creating transactional security versus the
imposition of entry barriers—determines the economic desirability,
vis-à-vis alternatives, of private legal systems. It is for this same
reason that some early systems of private ordering persisted into the

64. To be clear, Professor Bernstein deserves enormous credit for identifying and
articulating many of the administrative efficiencies found in systems of private law. See supra
notes 30, 51, 52 and accompanying text; see also Jason Scott Johnson, Should the Law Ignore
Commercial Norms?, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1791, 1810 (2001) (“Bernstein’s study . . . advances our
knowledge of private commercial lawmaking institutions . . . .”).
65. See, e.g., NORTH, supra note 10, at 111 (“We have long been aware that the tax
structure, regulations, judicial decisions, and statute laws . . . determine specific aspects of
economic performance . . . .”); Avner Greif & Eugene Kandel, Contract Enforcement
Institutions: Historical Perspective and Current Status in Russia, in ECONOMIC TRANSITION IN
EASTERN EUROPE AND RUSSIA: REALITIES OF REFORM 291, 318 (Edward P. Lazear ed., 1995)
(“Economic growth in market economies is fundamentally based on the ability to exchange,
which is limited by the ability to enforce contracts.”).
66. See AVNER GREIF, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN ECONOMY:
LESSONS FROM MEDIEVAL TRADE 343 (2006) (“In England . . . the state facilitated the
replacement of the community responsibility system with one based on individual legal
responsibility and the coercive power of the state.”).
67. Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive
Theory of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328, 2346 (2004) [hereinafter Richman,
Private Ordering] (“Merchants who want to transact with cotton mills and brokers must
undergo a rigorous application process before acquiring sufficient trust to enter independently
into transactions.”); Barak D. Richman, The Antitrust of Reputation Mechanisms: Institutional
Economics and Concerted Refusals To Deal, 95 VA. L. REV. 325, 335 (2009) [hereinafter
Richman, Antitrust] (“Because a good reputation is essentially a prerequisite to enjoying
profitable dealings, entry is largely limited to merchants who enjoy some reputational
sponsorship and tacit insurance from existing industry players.”).
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modern age, whereas most succumbed to the emergence of reliable
68
state-sponsored courts.
The adjudication-determination hypothesis’ second fault,
following from its first, is exposed by the flexibility of arbitration. If
adjudication costs were of primary concern, then industry groups
might affix tailored rules and procedures atop state-sponsored
enforcement. For example, a merchant community could develop its
own specialized legal templates and use state-sponsored courts to
enforce arbitration decisions. Through a trade association, the
community could require all of its members to use contracts that,
should a disagreement arise, compel disputing parties to use a private
dispute-resolution forum with preselected arbitrators, industrytailored law, and strict limitations on costly components of litigation
such as discovery. Courts would uphold and enforce any conclusions
69
by the arbitrators, and pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act and
similar state-law provisions, courts would even stay any parallel
70
litigation before them that is subject to an arbitration agreement.
Consequently, the industry could leave enforcement entirely to statesponsored courts while maintaining a private legal forum. This hybrid
would be the best of both worlds: all the administrative savings from
the privately tailored substantive law and procedures, yet no need to
rely on reputation mechanisms, nonlegal sanctions, or any other
instruments of private enforcement that, necessarily, erect costly
entry barriers.
Private legal systems, however, are distinct from typical
arbitration precisely because they rest atop private enforcement
mechanisms—and, in fact, they tend to prohibit their members from
seeking relief from state-sponsored courts, as victors in arbitration are

68. A popular hypothesis that accompanied examinations of underdeveloped legal systems
was that, in fact, relational contracting and private ordering would inevitably succumb to public
courts. See, e.g., P.J. FITZGERALD, SALMOND ON JURISPRUDENCE § 31 (12th ed. 2006)
(“Although custom is an important source of law in early times, its importance continuously
diminishes as the legal system grows.”); see also Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and
the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 215, 216
(1994) (“Many intellectuals believe that centralized law is inevitable, just as they once believed
that socialism was inevitable.”).
69. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16, 201–208 (2006).
70. E.g., id. § 3; see also Gillian K. Hadfield, Privatizing Commercial Law: Lessons from the
Middle and the Digital Ages 7 (Stanford Law Sch., John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ.,
Working Paper No. 195, 2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=220252 (“‘Private’ arbitration is a creature of contract and so is as much a matter of
‘public’ law as any contract.”).
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able to do. Given the costs of employing private enforcement, why
would private legal systems also institutionalize costly coordinated
punishments rather than piggyback off public courts? Or conversely,
why do so many industries rely primarily on standard arbitration in
which arbitration rulings are enforceable in state court, yet certain
industries operate entirely outside the legal system?
That private legal systems rely only on private enforcement, and
are thus distinct from typical arbitration, suggests that something
more than administrative savings is at work. Consistent with
proponents of the New Formalism, we see a move across all forms of
arbitration—and in several areas of state law as well—toward rules
73
and procedures that lead to swift and predictable judgments. But we
see significant variation in enforcement, with some parties enforcing
arbitration through the courts and others participating in insular
merchant communities that reject state-sponsored courts and rely
instead on coordinated punishments. Because administrative
efficiencies cannot explain this variation, an alternative source of
economizing must be at work. All merchant communities that invoke
74
private sanctions use specialized law, yet specialized law is
75
widespread beyond these insular merchant communities. The key to
understanding these unusual private legal systems, then, lies much
more in the economics of enforcement than in the economics of
adjudication.
The adjudication-determination hypothesis’ third error is its
presumption that private legal systems require arbitrators and well-

71. Bernstein suggests that diamond merchants are welcome to seek confirmation of a
Diamond Dealers’ Club judgment in state courts, but that such confirmation “is rarely
necessary.” Bernstein, supra note 51, at 129–30. I would argue, however, that state-court
confirmation would be futile. Instead of state courts serving as a supplemental enforcement
mechanism, state-court failures trigger the need for alternative enforcement. See Richman,
Antitrust, supra note 67, at 330–34 (“These important limitations on the capabilities of state
courts force the diamond industry to depend instead on private mechanisms to enforce
contracts.”).
72. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., supra notes 59–63 and accompanying text.
74. See Bernstein, supra note 51, at 115 (“[T]raders . . . have developed an elaborate,
internal system of rules, complete with distinctive institutions and sanctions, to handle disputes
among industry members.”); Richman, supra note 30, at 397 (“The [Diamond Dealers Club’s]
system of arbitration and information exchange thus sets the stage for other family- and
community-based institutions to enforce industry’s executory contracts . . . .”).
75. See generally Thomas Schultz, Private Legal Systems: What Cyberspace Might Teach
Legal Theorists, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 151 (2007) (discussing various systems of private law that
govern aspects of the online marketplace).
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developed private law. After all, the hypothesis assumes, if private
legal systems emerge because of administrative efficiencies, then it
would be strange indeed to have a legal system without any legal
substance or procedures. It would be like agreeing to arbitration
without identifying an arbitrator.
In fact, however, in parts of the diamond industry, disputes are
privately resolved without judges or law. Although Professor
Bernstein’s famous analysis of the New York Diamond Dealers Club
describes a world of arbitration with clear substantive rules and
clearly identified arbitrators and procedures, India’s diamond center
is very different. Consider the following exchange:
Author: So what happens when merchants have a disagreement?
Merchant: They resolve it. They always want to work things out.
Author: But what happens when they can’t resolve it themselves,
when there was a genuine misunderstanding or disagreement that
has no easy compromise solution?
Merchant: Then they’ll find a senior, respected person in the
76
industry and that person will resolve it.

Ninety-five percent of the world’s diamonds flow through India’s
diamond center. With its epicenter located in Mumbai and its
burgeoning cutting and polishing industry in the nearby state of
Gujarat, India is an emerging capital of the diamond industry and is
77
gradually overtaking New York and Antwerp in significance. Yet
there are no arbitrators and no binding arbitrations. Parties simply
resolve disputes on their own and establish their own order without
78
any law.
76. Interview with confidential source in the Diamond District, Mumbai, India (Mar. 13,
2008).
77. See Manjeet Kripalani, Polishing the Diamond Business, BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 11,
2000 (“De Beers, the longtime monopolist, is finding its cartel usurped by Canada, Russia, and
Australia, which want to go directly to diamond-cutting centers without using a middleman—a
move that could raise India’s current 55% share of the world diamond industry.”); Nicky
Oppenheimer, Diamonds and Dictators, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 1999, at A27 (stating that more
than 700,000 people are employed in the diamond-cutting industry in India). For a general
discussion of India’s emergence in the diamond industry, see PIRAMAL, BUSINESS MAHARAJAS
315–62 (1996).
78. For a discussion of how globalization forces are changing the diamond industry and of
how Mumbai’s emergence as a diamond center is a quintessential reflection of those forces, see
Barak D. Richman, Ethnic Networks, Extra-Legal Certainty and Globalisation: Peering into the
Diamond Industry, in CONTRACTUAL CERTAINTY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 31 (Volkmar
Gessner ed., 2009).
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These three problems are enough to discard the adjudicationdetermination hypothesis. Efficient adjudication procedures and
substantive rules cannot drive the emergence of private legal systems.
The flexibility of arbitration enables achieving administrative
efficiencies without developing private enforcement systems, and
diamond centers outside the United States reveal that private
enforcement systems thrive without structured arbitration. At the
very least, this conclusion should dampen the general enthusiasm for
private legal systems. If adjudication efficiencies are not responsible
for the emergence and survival of private legal systems, then scholars
should be more cautious in endorsing them as a model for arbitration
systems.
The heart of the hypothesis’ shortcoming, and the corresponding
weakness in the conventional legal-centric theory that undergirds it, is
its failure to recognize the particular costs inherent in private legal
systems. Legal scholars thus overstate the efficiencies of private legal
systems and thus incorrectly overpredict their incidence.
V. PRIVATE LEGAL SYSTEMS, PROPERLY UNDERSTOOD
How should private legal systems be understood vis-à-vis other
self-enforcement systems? And what then predicts the emergence of
private legal systems in the modern economy?
Whereas current scholarship emphasizes adjudication efficiencies
and thus conflates private legal systems with conventional arbitration
systems, a proper approach begins by examining the role of
enforcement costs through a lens of institutional economics. In short,
the adjudication-determination hypothesis should be discarded for the
enforcement-determination hypothesis. Focusing on this very different
category of efficiency considerations illustrates that private legal
systems belong much more squarely in the order-without-law
mechanism along with other systems that rest upon coordinated social
sanctions or private enforcement methods. Despite appearing like
typical arbitration systems, they arise out of rather particular
circumstances and economize on what could be called enforcement
costs. The enforcement-determination hypothesis suggests that
enforcement efficiencies are the horse that drives the emergence of
private legal systems, and adjudication efficiencies are largely
secondary. This hypothesis means that the schema depicted in Figure
1 is not just an illustration of alternative categories but also a
depiction of a causal, sequential model.
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What are enforcement costs and how, according to economic
logic, do they determine the incidence of private legal systems? A
starting point begins with a core principle of institutional economics,
which is that all institutional arrangements exhibit certain efficiencies
and costs, and articulating those comparative costs and benefits can
predict their emergence under different economic circumstances. A
comparative assessment of public versus private enforcement requires
79
assessing the institutional capacities of each mechanism.
The table below summarizes a comparative assessment of
80
enforcement costs associated with the alternative mechanisms.
Table 1: Public Courts Versus Reputation Mechanisms

Public Courts

Private Legal
Systems

Adjudication
Efficiencies

–

+

Nonexclusivity

+

–

The key insight reflected in the table is that both private and
public enforcement exhibit comparative efficiencies and costs,
relative to one another. Consistent with much of the legal literature,
private legal systems do achieve adjudication efficiencies that are
unattainable in public courts. As was discussed in Part III, they rest
on substantive and procedural rules, allowing for predictable rulings
and stark factual determinations that do not require significant
litigation costs. They follow expedited procedures that assure prompt
judgments. And they rely on arbitrators who are industry insiders and
have both expertise and experience closely relevant to the disputes
they judge. However expensive, slow, and inaccurate state-sponsored
79. A more complete institutional analysis requires comparing multiple mechanisms,
including vertically integrated firms. This analysis would include the paradigmatic make-or-buy
question in institutional economics and an assessment of both concerted sanctions and vertical
integration as alternative private mechanisms. For a more complete assessment, see Richman,
Private Ordering, supra note 67, at 2337–51.
80. For some policy implications of this comparative assessment, see Richman, Antitrust,
supra note 67, at 368–72.
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courts can be, private legal systems build rules and procedures to be
cheaper, faster, and more accurate.
A significant shortcoming of private enforcement, however, is
that it can only reach those who subscribe to it—reputation
mechanisms can only police those who place value in maintaining a
good reputation. Professor Galanter remarked that although
“indigenous communities” enjoy powers that are unavailable to
public courts, “the indigenous tribunal faces the problem of obtaining
leverage over those who are impervious to community opinion,
getting them to submit to its jurisdiction or to comply with its
81
decisions.” Thus, the reach of private law is limited to long-term
players who are assured of, and who credibly are committed to
pursuing, a long horizon of transactions.
This limitation leads to a critical drawback of private ordering:
reputation-based private enforcement erects sizable entry barriers.
Because only participating long-term players have incentives to
cooperate, newcomers who have not yet established a good
reputation are unable to commit credibly to uphold their contractual
promises. Thus, Professors John McMillan and Christopher Woodruff
noted that “[t]he corollary of ongoing relationships is a reluctance to
82
deal with firms outside the relationship.” Even an honest merchant
who has yet to demonstrate a good reputation will not be able to
transact business with other merchants.
Entry barriers impose many inefficiencies, especially dynamic
inefficiencies, to an economic system. They limit the threat of
superior competitors—those with lower costs, superior skill, or new
technologies—and shelter inefficient incumbents. The exclusivity of
privately ordered reputation mechanisms also sustains economic
homogeneity and conformity, precluding entrants with new business
models and entrants who might experiment with innovative
techniques. Relatedly, an ossified merchant community is more likely
to resist value-added competition. Because trade in a private system
occurs within a closed community comprised of traders who are
linked by channels of information and communication, merchants are
well positioned to collude on price or collectively deny competitive
83
entrants access to supply networks and other necessary resources.

81. Galanter, supra note 3, at 26.
82. McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 54, at 2454.
83. Both Professors McMillan and Woodruff and Professor Richard McAdams have
observed that relational contracting and closed economic networks can impose noneconomic
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These significant dynamic costs are tradeoffs with the also
significant benefits of greater transactional security and low-cost
adjudication. Recognizing these reciprocal costs of private legal
systems helps explain why these systems are not more widespread in
the modern economy. Similarly, it explains why the emergence of
reliable state-sponsored courts coincided with the waning of
relational exchange that relied on private enforcement. Accordingly,
enthusiasts of private legal systems should pause and consider these
significant drawbacks of reputational enforcement. But perhaps more
important, this Essay’s approach illustrates why enforcement costs
determine the incidence of private legal systems and thus are the
horse that leads the cart.
This Essay’s approach also should bring more clarity to our
understanding of private legal systems. Although those systems are
often characterized as arbitration systems with specialized law, in
reality they are dramatically different from conventional arbitration.
Private legal systems do indeed rely on arbitration, and they similarly
are credited with developing specialized systems of substantive and
procedural law. But both the arbitration and legal qualities of these
systems belie the true economic—and often social and historical—
forces that spawn their existence and create their efficiencies. They
instead emerge only when the benefits of attaining better
enforcement outweigh the heavy costs of creating entry barriers. This
is a much more balanced and determinative assessment than one
involving adjudication costs.
Thus, although Figure 1 depicts a very parsimonious mapping of
alternative enforcement regimes, it offers some lasting lessons. First,
it separates public from private enforcement, thereby properly
distinguishing private legal systems from typical arbitration. Second,
it emphasizes that economizing on enforcement costs, not
adjudication costs, determines the most efficient enforcement regime
harms as well, such as bigotry and persistent discrimination. See Richard H. McAdams,
Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination,
108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1049–53 (1995) (describing the economic forces that led to the
development of the Jim Crow South); McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 54, at 2423 (“Private
order also can cause or perpetuate racial or gender discrimination.”). Professors Curtis
Milhaupt and Mark West and Professor Diego Gambetta also reveal that trust-based exchange
and closed ethnic networks can use violence, in addition to reputational mechanisms, to enforce
compliance. See DIEGO GAMBETTA, THE SICILIAN MAFIA: THE BUSINESS OF PRIVATE
PROTECTION 173 (1993) (“Thieves who do not respect protected customers are punished, at
times with extreme violence.”); Milhaupt & West, supra note 31, at 47–48 (discussing the
problem of organized crime in high-trust societies like Japan).
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for particular merchant transactions. And third, it poses deep
challenges to the conventional legal-centric theory that aims to
understand commerce through legal rules rather than through the
underlying institutions.
CONCLUSION
Although private legal systems have captured the imagination of
a wide assortment of scholars and disciplines, that attention has not
yet translated into a comprehensive understanding of those systems.
One source of confusion has been a preoccupation with
administrative costs, which are naturally of primary concern to legal
scholars but in fact are a diversion from the underlying economic
forces that sustain private enforcement mechanisms. This
preoccupation might be another instance of Professor Galanter’s legal
centralism, and perhaps the biggest lesson is that even if organizations
look and act like courts or arbitrators, they in fact might more closely
resemble instruments used in prelegal societies.
At the very least, scholars studying private legal systems should
scrutinize enforcement costs more than administrative costs, and they
should make greater use of institutional economics than litigation
economics. But there might also need to be a wholesale reevaluation
of the implications that have emerged from studies of private legal
systems. Rather than heralding their efficiencies, there should be
greater recognition of their costs; rather than encouraging industries
to take up tailored arbitration, there should be greater study of when
private legal systems emerge and where they succeed; and rather than
treating private legal systems as a squarely legal product, there should
be greater adherence to early law and society conclusions, that legal
and legal-like processes must be viewed within the underlying social
and economic context in which they emerge. The significance of
private legal systems is not how they appear but what lies beneath.

